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THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: THE LATEST
EXAMPLE OF "NEW FEDERALISM" IN
THE STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has di-
minished its protection of individual rights. In contrast to the
Warren Court's view of the judiciary as the guardian of indi-
vidual liberties, the Burger Court afforded the individual only
minimal guarantees.' Although this retrenchment has af-
fected all the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule has suffered the most.2
The exclusionary rule, which suppresses evidence seized in vi-
olation of the fourth amendment,3 has come under increasing
attack from those who assert that "technical" police errors
should not allow criminals to go free.4
In United States v. Leon,5 the Supreme Court adopted a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Evidence ob-
tained pursuant to a warrant based on less than probable
cause will now be admitted against a defendant at trial if the
police officer was acting in good faith.6 Thus, the exception
reflects a further retreat from previously well established
fourth amendment protections. If the Rehnquist Court fol-
lows the trend set by the Burger Court, the states may be left
1. See J. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD
NIXON'S AMERICA 288 (1973); Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Crimi-
nal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J. 249 (1971).
2. Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873,
874 (1975) [hereinafter Wilkes, More on the New Federalism].
3. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was first applied to federal criminal
proceedings in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See infra text accompany-
ing note 15. The rule was extended to the states forty-seven years later in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See infra text accompanying note 32.
An analogous exclusionary rule operates in the fifth amendment area to suppress
coerced confessions and in the sixth amendment area to suppress statements made with-
out assistance of counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v.
Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 9 (1977); Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental
Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1982).
5. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6. Id. at 905-25.
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as the only source of protection for an individual's fourth
amendment rights. Recognizing this, a number of states have
rejected the Leon good faith exception on state constitutional
grounds.7
This Comment will first take an historical in-depth look at
how the Supreme Court has slowly strangled the life from the
exclusionary rule. Next, there will be an analysis of the case
in which the good faith exception was adopted. Finally, this
Comment will examine the "new federalism" among states
that are willing to provide their citizens with greater protec-
tion than that provided under the Federal Constitution.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides a "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . ".. 8 Through this amendment, the
framers intended to protect citizens of the New Republic from
the unwarranted governmental intrusions they were subjected
to in England.9 Although the proscription against unrea-
sonable searches was clear, the remedy for a violation of the
fourth amendment was not specified. Thus, the Supreme
Court faced the task of effectuating an individual's constitu-
tional rights. In order to make the fourth amendment viable,
the Court declared that evidence seized during an unconstitu-
tional search must be excluded at the individual's criminal
trial.' 0 The enunciation of this exclusionary rule has had a
7. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
9. In England, general warrants and writs of assistance permitted government offi-
cials to arrest anyone and search any place they wished. For a discussion of the events
leading to the adoption of the fourth amendment, see generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978).
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See infra text accompanying note
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far-reaching and controversial effect on the law of search and
seizure.
A. The Creation of the Exclusionary Rule
The origins of the exclusionary rule can be traced back to
the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States," in which the Supreme
Court held that demanding private papers from a defendant to
use against him at trial was an invasion of the "indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty.""2 Relying on both the fourth amendment's ban against
unreasonable searches and the fifth amendment's ban against
compelled self-incrimination, the Court prohibited the intro-
duction of the papers into evidence.13 Moreover, the Boyd
Court noted that it was the duty of the Court to guard the
constitutional rights of citizens "against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.' 14
The recognition that courts have an obligation to protect
individual rights from governmental intrusion was secured by
the Supreme Court's enunciation of the exclusionary rule in
the landmark case of Weeks v. United States.I5 A unanimous
Court held that evidence obtained during an illegal search and
seizure violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights,' 6
and that use of the evidence in a federal criminal proceeding
was prohibited:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 630.
13. Id. at 634-35. In Boyd, the evidence was obtained by the use of a subpoena
rather than an unlawful search and seizure. Thus. the exclusion of the evidence was
based on the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments as opposed to the
fourth amendment alone. In a subsequent case, Boyd was construed as pertaining only
to cases in which a defendant was compelled to give testimony against himself. See
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
14. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
15. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks case involved an outrageous search of the
defendant's home in connection with an illegal lottery scheme. The police, acting with-
out a warrant, ransacked the house and took several things unrelated to the illegal activ-
ity. Id. at 387. For an excellent article on the development of the exclusionary rule see
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
16. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 397. In contrast to Boyd, the Weeks Court relied solely on
the fourth amendment as authorization for excluding evidence at trial. Id. at 393-97.
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the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right
to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution.' 7
The Weeks Court emphasized not only the importance of
preserving the individual's right to privacy but also the integ-
rity of judicial proceedings. Courts were not to condone the
state's illegal activity by permitting the introduction of the
tainted evidence. 18 Justice Day explained what has thus be-
come known as the judicial integrity rationale of the exclu-
sionary rule: "The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures.., should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution .. ,,19
The fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures was first applied to the states, by virtue
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, in Wolf v.
Colorado.20 The states were not, however, constitutionally re-
quired to employ the exclusionary rule as the means of enforc-
ing the fourth amendment prohibitions.2z Instead, the Court
held that it was within the competency of the states to choose
between exclusion as a sanction and other equally effective
17. Id. at 393.
18. Justices Holmes and Brandeis were major proponents of the judicial integrity
rationale. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See generally Grant,
Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 S.
CAL. L. REV. 60 (1941).
19. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21. The Wolf holding marked the first separation of the fourth amendment right
from the exclusionary remedy. The dissent soundly criticized the decision to let states
implement their own sanctions: "[There is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion.
That is no sanction at all." Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
The views expressed by the majority and the dissent in Wolf illustrate the debate
that still divides the Supreme Court. One view sees the exclusionary rule as only one of
several alternatives for vindication of a fourth amendment violation. The opposite view
considers the rule to be mandated by the fourth amendment itself to aid in regulation of
the law enforcement system as a whole.
1987]
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remedies. 2 Thus, the right was federal, but the remedy was
decided by each state. 3
The asymmetry which Wolf introduced into fourth
amendment law was illustrated in Lustig v. United States.24
There the Court held that evidence given to federal authorities
''on a silver platter" by state officers was not excludable in
federal trials.25 The silver platter doctrine enabled federal
courts to convict a defendant with evidence the state police
seized illegally, so long as the state police broke the law with-
out federal assistance.26
The Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the double stan-
dard of admissibility created by the silver platter doctrine led
to its eradication in Elkins v. United States.27 Federal courts
could no longer receive unconstitutionally seized evidence
from federal or state officials. Instead, the fourteenth amend-
ment's limitations on state government were held to be coex-
tensive with the fourth amendment limitations on the federal
government.2  This holding foreshadowed the extension of
the exclusionary rule to the states.
The Supreme Court then turned its attention to the justi-
fications for the exclusionary rule. The Court announced that
the "purpose [of the rule] is to deter - to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
22. At the time Wolf was decided only 16 of the 47 states had adopted the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. at 38, TABLE 1. Other remedies for illegal search and seizure included
a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and a federal criminal action under 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1976). See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Schroeder, Deterring Fourth
Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361
(1981).
23. See Geller, supra note 22, at 629.
24. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
25. Id. at 78-80. This phrase was coined in Lustig to refer to situations in which
state officials conducted illegal searches and then gave the seized evidence to federal
officials for use in federal court. If the federal officials had seized the evidence them-
selves, it would have been inadmissible in federal court because they were bound by the
exclusionary rule. Thus, the silver platter doctrine was an easy way to get around the
exclusionary rule until the rule was extended to the states.
26. See Grant, The Tarnished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of Ille-
gally Seized Evidence, 8 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1961).
27. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Before the Elkins decision, the only way to forbid the
introduction of illegally seized evidence by state officers in state court was to show that
it "'shock[ed] the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165. 172 (1952).
28. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1379-80.
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way - by removing the incentive to disregard it."2 9 This em-
phasis on deterrence was a departure from the Weeks case
which focused on the importance of private property and judi-
cial integrity. The significance of the departure, however, was
not clear until after the exclusionary rule had been applied to
the states.30
The Supreme Court ended a decade of confusion following
Wolf v. Colorado, by overruling the decision and repudiating
its rationale in Mapp v. Ohio.31 In the Mapp case, the police
made a warrantless entry into the defendant's home to search
for a bombing suspect. No suspects were found but the officers
did uncover four obscene books that were hidden in the base-
ment. As a result, Mapp was arrested, tried, and convicted of
possession of obscene materials. 32 On appeal, the Supreme
Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states, holding
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in viola-
tion of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissi-
ble in a state court."'33
In the Court's view, the exclusionary rule was no longer
one among a range of options to be selected by the states.3 4  It
was "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 35 Indeed, had the exclusionary rule not been
inherent in the fourth amendment to the Constitution, it could
never have been applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The Court explained that rejection of the Wolf
approach was required because:
29. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
30. See infra text accompanying note 61.
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. Id. at 643-46. The Ohio Supreme Court relied on Wolfand affirmed the lower
court's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and overruled that part of Wolfthat
said state courts were not required to use the exclusionary rule. See Stewart, supra note
15, at 1367.
33. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. An undeniable factor in extending the exclusionary rule
to the states was the ineffectiveness of other remedies. See Schroeder, supra note 22, at
1386-97.
34. See genera'lly Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL. L.
REV. 80 (1969); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319; Wilson, Perspectives of Mapp v. Ohio, 11 U. KAN. L. REV. 423 (1963).
35. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. The prohibition also applies to the fruits of the illegally
seized evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evi-
dence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.3 6
Thus, the exclusionary rule became an integral part of the
fourth amendment guarantee of individual privacy.37
B. The Debate: Should the Criminal Go Free Because the
Constable Blundered? 38
1. The Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule has been under constant criticism
since it was first announced in Weeks v. United States.39 Be-
cause the rule suppresses otherwise reliable evidence, the most
obvious criticism is that it operates to protect fourth amend-
ment guarantees only by imposing an unreasonably high cost
on society:40 "The physical evidence sought to be excluded is
typically reliable and often the most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant .... Appli-
36. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. See generally Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v.
Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REV. 185 (1961).
37. The Mapp holding employed all of the various rationales previously cited for
the exclusionary rule. Justice Clark summed it up by stating, "[o]ur decision ... gives
to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the po-
lice officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." 367
U.S. at 660.
38. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Justice Cardozo
was an outspoken opponent of the exclusionary rule. In DeFore he stated, "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered . . . . A room is searched
against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found .... The privacy of the
home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free." Id. at 23-24, 150 N.E. at 587-88.
39. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Some of the rule's worst critics are presently seated on the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., con-
curring); California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of stay); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261-71 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
For an excellent example of the debate compare Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule:
Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978) with Kamisar, Is the Exclu-
sionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62
JUDICATURE 67 (1978).
40. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1393.
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cation of the rule thus deflects the truth-finding process and
often frees the guilty."'"
The truth-finding process is distorted because relevant evi-
dence is barred and as a result, the defendant is not tried on
the basis of "all the evidence which exposes the truth."4 Fur-
ther, the trial's focus is diverted from ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant to scrutinizing police behavior.43
When a criminal is released because the police have violated
his constitutional rights, it implies that the officer's conduct
posed a greater threat to society than the criminal act. In
cases of egregious police behavior, this implication may be
correct. 4 But when the crime is first degree murder and the
sole impropriety of the police was their failure to obtain the
proper warrant, suppression of the evidence occasions public
outrage. In such instances, opponents maintain that the
criminal should not avoid punishment because of a mere
"technicality."4
6
The second criticism of the exclusionary rule is that there
are no benefits to balance the cost of the rule's application.
For example, the exclusionary rule has been justified on the
basis of judicial integrity. This rationale is easily defeated be-
cause the introduction of illegally seized evidence "work[s] no
new Fourth Amendment wrong." 47 Thus, the court is not
perceived as a party to the constitutional violation when it al-
lows the evidence in at trial. Instead, opponents argue that it
is the exclusion of reliable evidence and the release of
41. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490.
42. Id. at 489 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
43. See Wilkey, supra note 39, at 222.
44. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In this case, the police
jumped on Rochin and attempted to retrieve the pills that he had swallowed. When
their attempt failed, Rochin was taken to a hospital where doctors forced an emetic
solution into his stomach, causing him to regurgitate the evidence. Id. at 166.
45. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). See also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
46. Many critics argue that the exclusionary rule is hypertechnical: "[F]rom the
point of view of laymen unversed in refinements of constitutional theory, [the American
exclusionary rule] is sometimes an outrage to common sense. It often results in the
freeing of someone convicted of a vicious criminal act for what strikes the crime - con-
scious public as finicking or trivial reasons." Wilkey, supra note 39, at 223 n.32 (quot-
ing The Washington Star, July 7, 1975, at A16).
47. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
criminals that discredits the judicial system.4" Similarly, the
proclaimed benefit of deterrence does not withstand close
analysis. Excluding the evidence will theoretically punish the
police officer who made the illegal search and seizure and thus
deter the police from committing similar violations in the fu-
ture. But opponents of the rule assert that there is no empiri-
cal data to support the conclusion that excluding evidence
against a defendant punishes the officer involved or deters
other officers from future violations.49
The third criticism commonly raised to the exclusionary
rule focuses on its indiscriminate approach. Evidence is sup-
pressed without consideration of whether the police officer
willfully violated the law or used his best judgment under
the circumstances." The sanction seems extreme in light of
the fact that the police are often forced to make quick deci-
sions regarding whether there is probable cause to support a
search. Under the general language of the fourth amendment,
there is much room for disagreement. The rule's indifference
to the severity of the police officer's error "is contrary to the
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of jus-
tice."' 51 As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, "society has at
least as much right to expect rationally graded responses from
judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment' we inflict
on all evidence when police error is shown in its acquisi-
tion."52 Since the fourth amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation
48. See Wilkey, supra note 39, at 223-25.
49. The studies done on the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect are inconclusive at
best. See S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLE-
GALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: All Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973).
The issue is complicated by differing perspectives on the type of deterrence the rule
exerts. The "specific deterrence" rationale theorizes that the rule should deter individ-
ual police officers. The "systematic deterrence" rationale asserts that the rule exerts a
regulatory effect on the law enforcement system as a whole. See Mertens & Wasser-
strom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and
Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 395-99 (1981).
50. See Wilkey, supra note 39, at 225-26.
51. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
52. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
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of its command, opponents of the rule assert that a less costly
alternative should be employed.
2. The Arguments for the Exclusionary Rule
Proponents of the exclusionary rule respond that much of
this criticism is misdirected." It is not the sanction that im-
poses limits on the exercise of police power, it is the constitu-
tional provisions themselves. As Justice Clark noted in Mapp
v. Ohio: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law
that sets him free." 54 The adoption of the fourth amendment
reflects the framers' intent that it is better that some criminals
go free than that the privacy rights of all people be sacrificed.
The problem with the exclusionary rule is that it works after
the fact, so that by then we know who the criminal is, the
evidence against him, and the other circumstances of the
case. If there were some way to make police obey, in ad-
vance, the commands of the Fourth Amendment, we would
lose at least as many criminal convictions as we do today,
but in that case we would not know of the evidence which
the police could discover only through a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. It is possible that the real problem
with the exclusionary rule is that it flaunts before us the
price we pay for the Fourth Amendment.5
As a means of ensuring the fourth amendment guarantee
of privacy, proponents argue that the rule has accomplished
just what was intended. Following Mapp v. Ohio,5 6 police
academies began to train officers on the contours of fourth
amendment procedures 7.5  As a result of the increased amount
of training, there was a dramatic increase in the number of
search warrants issued. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is
successful in promoting observance of the fourth amendment.
The fact that violations still occur does not indicate that the
exclusionary rule is ineffective. Rather, it reflects the need for
53. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1392. See generally Canon, Ideology and Reality
in the Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument for Its Retention,
23 S. TEX. L.J. 559 (1982).
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
55. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAl. JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIAl. 208
(1978).
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. See Kamisar, supra note 39, at 69-73.
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continued observation by the Court to ensure that the rule is
enforced.58
Not only is there a beneficial impact on law enforcement
agencies, but the costs of applying the rule are not nearly as
high as some opponents assert. The exclusionary rule very
rarely has an adverse effect on the outcome of a criminal trial.
One study suggested that the rule results in the non-prosecu-
tion or non-conviction of only 0.6% to 2.35% of individuals
arrested for felonies.5 9 Although the estimates are higher for
crimes in which the prosecution depends heavily on physical
evidence, the non-prosecution rate is still within the range of
2.8% to 7.1%.60 Proponents of the rule argue that this is not
too high a price to pay to ensure the sanctity of a person's
home and effects. Therefore, the exclusionary rule should re-
main the safeguard of fourth amendment rights.
C. Exceptions to the Rule of Mapp
Faced with the inherent conflict between the exclusionary
rule and the trial of a criminal defendant based on all relevant
evidence, the Supreme Court opted in favor of the latter after
1961. Gradually the Court retreated from the broad assertion
of fourth amendment rights announced in Mapp v. Ohio, using
the "new" deterrence rationale to carve out exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.6 Pointing to deterrence as the primary ob-
jective, the Court reasoned that anything that did not serve
the rule's deterrent purpose did not justify the cost of its appli-
58. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1395-96.
59. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Leant) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 621.
60. Id. at 680.
61. Compared to the other justifications for the rule, the deterrence rationale was
relatively new. It was first announced only one year before Mapp v. Ohio was decided.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
Since Mapp, the Supreme Court has created several exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (searches under hot pur-
suit); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view searches); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (administrative searches); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and
frisk searches); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (searches under exigent
circumstances).
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cation. For example, the case of Linkletter v. Walker62
presented the issue of whether the Mapp holding should be
applied retroactively. The Supreme Court explained that the
deterrence of lawless police actions was the only effect of the
exclusionary rule. Since the misconduct of police prior to the
Mapp case had already occurred, the deterrent purpose of the
rule would not be advanced by making the holding
retroactive.63
The deterrence rationale was again used to confine the
scope of the exclusionary rule in Alderman v. United States.64
The Court held that defendants whose fourth amendment
rights were not violated lacked standing to move to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment rights
of others. The rationale for the ruling was that the additional
benefit of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
did not justify the accompanying infringement on the public's
interest in prosecuting those accused of a crime on the basis of
all the evidence.65
Although these cases limited the application of the exclu-
sionary rule, they did not attack the rule itself. The direct
assault came in the dissenting opinion of Bivens v. Six Un-
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 66 in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger criticized the use of the exclusionary rule in any situation.
Based on the lack of empirical evidence showing that the rule
has deterrent value, he asserted it should be replaced by a
more effective remedy.67 While the Chief Justice stated that
62. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
63. In deciding whether to make a holding apply retroactively, the Court considers
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967).
64. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
65. Id. at 174-75. The Court's analysis of the costs versus the benefits involved in
application of the exclusionary rule led to the balancing approach adopted in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See infra text accompanying note 70. See
generally Comment, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment,
93 YALE L.J. 1127 (1984) (an in-depth look at the balancing approach).
66. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The former Chief Justice has
always been a staunch opponent of the exclusionary rule. See Burger, Who Will Watch
the Watchman, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964).
67. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger asserted that Con-
gress should enact an administrative remedy against the government itself to compen-
sate persons whose fourth amendment rights had been violated. He argued that such a
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the rule should not be abandoned until an alternative remedy
was implemented, he indicated that his Court was receptive to
the change: "Independent of the alternative embraced in this
dissenting opinion, I believe the time has come to re-examine
the scope of the exclusionary rule and consider at least some
narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the anomalies it has
produced. 68
In keeping with the historical tendency of the Supreme
Court to adopt the position of its Chief Justice, the Court be-
gan to "narrow the thrust" of the exclusionary rule.69 In
United States v. Calandra,7 ° the Court refused to invoke the
rule when a grand jury witness was questioned about illegally
seized evidence. After extensively quoting the deterrence lan-
guage used in Elkins v. United States,7 1 the Court concluded
that "[iun sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." 72
This statement has had several far-reaching implications.
For the first time, deterrence was advanced as the paramount
justification of the exclusionary rule and the judicial integrity
rationale was discarded by the Court.73 Justice Powell made
statutory scheme would have an advantage over the exclusionary rule because it would
provide some remedy to the innocent victims of police misconduct.
68. Id. at 424.
69. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court: The Constitutional Business of the Supreme
Court, O.T. 1969, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1-2.
70. 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974). For a detailed analysis of the Calandra holding
see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974); Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclu-
sionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition "?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983).
71. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
72. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Justice Brennan. joined by Justices Douglas and
Marshall, criticized the majority's characterization of the exclusionary rule as a judi-
cially created deterrence measure: "This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a
determination whether its application in a particular type of proceeding furthers deter-
rence of future police misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it is a pur-
poseful rejection, of the historical objective and purpose of the rule." Id. at 356
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. The majority of the Court gradually disregarded the judicial integrity rationale
as they were presented with police conduct far less egregious than that in Weeks and
Mapp. The dissenters, however, still asserted that originally the rule was based on judi-
cial integrity and it should remain that way.
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it clear that exclusion was not necessary to keep courts from
participating in unconstitutional activity: "Questions based
on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the
product of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no
new Fourth Amendment wrong.'' 74
The statement also settled the question of the basis for the
exclusionary rule. According to the Supreme Court in Calan-
dra, exclusion was not one of the rights conferred by the
fourth amendment. 75 Instead, it was a remedy designed to ef-
fectuate those rights. The characterization of the exclusionary
rule as a remedial device gave rise to the balancing process
used today to determine whether application of the rule is
warranted in a particular case.
In practice, balancing the cost of excluding relevant evi-
dence against the potential for deterring police misconduct
usually leads to admission of the evidence. For example, the
Court permitted the use of illegally seized evidence in a fed-
eral civil suit on the grounds that the costs outweighed the
benefits. 76 The Court also allowed the use of evidence seized
in violation of fourth amendment standards to impeach de-
fendants testifying in their own behalf. 7 Finally, the Court
refused to exclude evidence when law enforcement agents ac-
ted in a good faith reliance upon laws later held to be
unconstitutional. 78
Thus, the exclusionary rule has evolved from a consti-
tutional right to its present interpretation as a judicial remedy
applicable only when it will advance the goal of deterrence.
This represents a dangerous trend. For the first time, the
United States Supreme Court has retrenched on a constitu-
tional right. Yet, the modification occurred without any ex-
planation from the Court. One commentator stated that a
major success of the rule's critics has been in redefining the
issue: "By portraying the exclusionary rule as a pragmatic so-
cial policy, rather than as a necessary adjunct to basic con-
74. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
75. Id. at 347-48.
76. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
77. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954).




stitutional principles, the critics have shifted the scope of
debate from their losing position on legal principles to the am-
biguous outcome of empirical evaluation." 9 It is with knowl-
edge of the Supreme Court's shift from the interest in
protecting individual rights to the interest in convicting the
guilty that the good faith exception should be analyzed.
D. The Road to Good Faith
The Supreme Court's latest effort to restrict the exclu-
sionary rule is the good faith exception. Proponents of the
exception argue that the goal of deterrence is not furthered
when a police officer, acting in good faith, does not realize that
his conduct has violated the fourth amendment.80 In addition
to the subjective standard, there is the objective requirement
that the officer's ignorance be reasonable. The good faith ex-
ception first received attention by virtue of its mention in Jus-
tice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell: '
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but
in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evi-
dence they have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can
have no deterrent effect. The officers, if they do their duty,
will act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the fu-
ture; and the only consequence of the rule as presently ad-
ministered is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is
79. Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule:
A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.
740, 776-77 (1974).
80. Due to the growing realization that many of the Supreme Court's decisions in
the fourth amendment area are unclear and difficult to apply, the good faith exception
has become a major topic of debate. See, e.g., Brown, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 655 (1982); Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restate-
ment of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982); Kamisar.
Gates, "'Probable Cause," "Good Faith" and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551 (1984):
LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon. Its Rationale and
Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895; Leonard, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: A Reasonable Approach for Criminal Justice, 4 WHITTIER L. REV.
33 (1982).
81. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Proposals for a modification of the exclusionary rule have
come from governmental and academic levels also. See ATFORNEY GENERAL'S T-\SK
FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAt. REPORT 55 (Aug. 17. 1981) (proposal for the good
faith exception).
On the academic level, the American Law Institute promulgated a Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure which provided that a motion to suppress illegally obtained
evidence should be granted only if the court finds the violation to be willful. See A
MODEL CODE OF PR--ARRAIGNMFiNT PROCEDURE § 290.2(2) (1975).
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kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding function of
the proceeding is substantially impaired or a trial totally
aborted. 2
Justice White's position did not go unnoticed. After hear-
ing oral arguments in Illinois v. Gates,8 3 the Supreme Court set
the case aside for reargument on the issue of whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be modified to include a good faith ex-
ception. The Court subsequently declined to address the issue
because it was not raised in the lower courts. Nevertheless,
the case gave Justice White an opportunity to expand on the
line of reasoning he began in Stone. He stated that irrespec-
tive of its original rationale, the exclusionary rule is no longer
recognized as a constitutional right.84 Instead, as set forth in
United States v. Calandra,85 and its progeny,86 the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to deter police miscon-
duct. 87 In cases of good faith violations of the fourth amend-
ment, there will be only a minimal deterrent effect. Since the
cost of invoking the exclusionary rule outweighs the deterrent
effect achieved by its strict application, an exception should be
created. 88
82. Stone, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
83. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Prior to Gates, courts used the two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test in determining whether there was the requisite probable cause to issue a
warrant. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969). The first prong considered the "veracity" of the information provided.
The second prong examined the "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of the inform-
ant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228-29 (1983). In Gates, the Supreme Court aban-
doned the two-prong test and adopted the more relaxed "totality of the circumstances"
test to establish probable cause. Id. at 229-35.
84. Gates, 462 U.S. at 254 (White, J., concurring).
85. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
86. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Cec-
colini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
87. Gates, 462 U.S. at 257 (White, J., concurring). Justice White explained:
Exclusion of evidence is not a personal constitutional right but a remedy which
like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of its imposition.
The trend and direction of our exclusionary rule decisions indicate not a lesser
concern with safeguarding the Fourth Amendment but a fuller appreciation of
the high costs incurred when probative, reliable evidence is barred because of
investigative error.
Id.
88. The Fifth Circuit adopted a good faith exception in United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). The holding
was based on what that court perceived to be the Supreme Court's adoption of a techni-
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III. THE ADOPTION OF A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: UNITED
STA TES V LEON
In United States v. Leon,89 the California Police Depart-
ment initiated a drug trafficking investigation based on a tip
from a confidential informant.90 After surveillance of the re-
spondent's activities, an affidavit was prepared and a search
warrant was issued by a state court judge. A subsequent
search uncovered large quantities of cocaine and
methaqualone. 9'
Upon indictment for federal drug offenses, the respondents
moved to suppress the evidence. The district court granted
the motion in part,92 concluding that the affidavit was insuffi-
cient to establish probable cause.93 While noting that the of-
ficer involved had acted in good faith, the court rejected the
suggestion that good faith reliance on a warrant would justify
cal violation. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975). See generally Comment, Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Excep-
tion - The Fifth Circuit's Approach in United States v. Williams, 15 GA. L. REV. 487
(1981).
89. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard in-
volved the murder of a young woman. Upon finding her badly burned body in a vacant
lot, the police initiated an investigation which led them to one of her boyfriends. The
police then applied for and received a search warrant to search his home. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981, 984-86 (1984).
90. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901. There were actually four defendants charged in the
Leon case and the facts given refer to the investigation and proceedings against all four
of them. The tip related to various drug deals including one that the informant had
witnessed himself. Id.
91. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902. The search of Sheppard's home produced a pair of
bloodstained boots, a hairpiece subsequently identified as the victim's, and a woman's
bloodstained earring. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987 n.4.
92. Leon, 468 U.S. at 903. The court granted the motions only in part because
none of the respondents had the requisite standing to challenge all of the searches. Id.
For a discussion of the standing requirement see supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
93. Leon, 468 U.S. at 903. Because the informant had made the observations of the
respondents' illegal activity six months before telling the police, there was a staleness
problem. Also, the affidavit failed to establish the informant's credibility. Id. at n.2.
Thus, the warrant failed to meet the probable cause standard under the Aguilar-Spinelli
test.
In Sheppard, the warrant was issued on a pre-printed form authorizing searches for
controlled substances rather than weapons. Further, the affidavit specifying the items to
be seized was not attached. The warrant, therefore, was defective in that it failed to
describe with particularity the items to be seized. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987.
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not applying the exclusionary rule.94 The court of appeals af-
firmed, also rejecting the invitation to recognize a good faith
exception.95 The United States Supreme Court reversed, how-
ever, holding that "the excusionary rule should be modified so
as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evi-
dence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause."96
A. The Leon Majority
Justice White, writing for the majority, began by stating
that the fourth amendment does not explicitly refer to the ex-
clusionary rule. Thus, the decision to apply the sanction is an
issue separate from the question of a fourth amendment viola-
tion.97 To determine if the exclusionary rule is appropriate
in a particular case, Justice White stated that the Court must
employ the cost-benefit analysis used in United States v. Ca-
landra.98 In evaluating the costs, the Court referred to the
substantial social cost of the rule's "interference with the
criminal justice system's truth-finding function" and the con-
94. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904. In Sheppard, the lower court let the evidence in because
the police had acted in good faith. However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reversed because the United States Supreme Court had not recognized a good
faith exception. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987.
95. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
government did not challenge the finding of insufficient probable cause. Although it
may have had a valid argument under the new probable cause standard announced in
Illinois v. Gates, the government was only interested in establishing a good faith excep-
tion. Thus, the good faith question was the only issue presented to the Supreme Court.
Id.
96. Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. The Sheppard Court concluded that the exclusionary
rule was not applicable to situations where the officer acted in "objectively reasonable
reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is
determined to be invalid." Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88. Therefore, the evidence
seized was admissible even though the warrant did not state with particularity the items
to be seized.
The Court noted that the police officer had properly described the items to be seized
in the affidavit and had reasonably relied on the magistrate's representations that the
search requested was authorized. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989. Leon and Sheppard to-
gether create the good faith rule for situations in which the police possess a warrant.
97. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 223 (1983)).
98. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Supreme Court reaffirmed its proposition that the use
of evidence seized from a past illegal search "'work[s] no new Fourth Amendment
wrong." Id. at 354. Thus, the Court fully embraced the concept that the exclusionary
rule is only a remedial device and not a constitutional mandate.
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sequence that "some guilty defendants may go free or receive
reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains."99 In
evaluating the benefits, the Court concluded that in cases of
good faith reliance on a defective search warrant, the deter-
rent effect was "marginal or non-existent."' 10 This reasoning
focused on the officer's good faith reliance on the validity of
the search warrant rather than on the magistrate's good faith
determination of probable cause.
Justice White gave three reasons why excluding evidence
would not have a deterrent effect on the issuing judge or mag-
istrate. First, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to modify
police behavior rather than "punish the errors of judges and
magistrates."'' 1 Second, there is no indication that magis-
trates are inclined to circumvent fourth amendment limita-
tions. Third, the rule is not effective as a deterrent to judges
because they are "not adjuncts to the law enforcement team,"
nor do they have a personal "stake in the outcome of particu-
lar criminal prosecutions."' t02 Based on these assertions, the
Supreme Court concluded that if a deterrent effect were to be
found, it must be on the behavior of the individual police of-
ficer. Since "[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's error,
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deter-
rence of Fourth Amendment violations," the good faith ex-
ception was adopted. 03
99. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
100. Id. at 922.
101. Id. at 916.
102. Id. at 917. The Court dismissed as speculative the arguments that application
of the exclusionary rule to the facts in Leon and Sheppard would promote the police to
be diligent in their duties and discourage magistrate shopping. Id. at 918-21. The
Court also rejected the suggestion that the good faith exception would inhibit the
growth of fourth amendment law. Id. at 922-25.
103. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. Despite the creation of the good faith exception. there
are some situations in which the exclusionary rule will apply.
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge
in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false .... The exception ... will also not apply in [those] cases where
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role . . . [such that] no
reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. . . . Finally. . . . a
warrant may be so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reason-
ably presume it to be valid.
Id. at 923.
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B. The Leon Dissent
Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall dissented from
the majority position, reiterating arguments they had posed
since the Calandra decision. Justice Brennan first attacked
the premise that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created
remedy rather than a constitutional right. He pointed out
that such a conclusion does not logically follow from the fact
that the fourth amendment does not expressly provide for the
exclusion of evidence: "Many of the Constitution's most vital
imperatives are stated in general terms and the task of giving
meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent judi-
cial decision-making in the context of concrete cases." 1" Nor
does such a conclusion follow from the cases that created the
exclusionary rule. According to Weeks v. United States 10 5 and
Mapp v. Ohio,10 6 the right of exclusion was a "coordinate com-
ponent" of the right to be free from unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusions.1 0 7
Even ignoring the constitutional origins of the rule, the
dissenters still felt that the deterrence theory was "misguided
and unworkable."108 They stated that the emphasis on the
empiricism of a deterrence principle drew the Court into "a
curious world where the 'costs' of excluding illegally obtained
evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the 'benefits'
of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of
the hand." 10 9 The dissenters criticized the Court's inability to
recognize the main benefit of the rule, namely institutional ob-
servance of fourth amendment requirements. Justice Brennan
feared that the good faith exception would remove this incen-
tive and place a "premium on police ignorance of the law. '" 0
104. Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
106. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. Leon, 468 U.S. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was
based on his view of the exclusionary rule being constitutionally compelled as indicated
by the Weeks and Mapp decisions. He also asserted the judicial integrity rationale of
the older cases which forbade courts from aiding the government in its violation of the
Constitution. Id. at 935-38.
108. Id. at 930.
109. Id. at 929.
110. Id. at 955. This fear was echoed in Justice Blackmun's concurrence. He
stated that the Leon decision would have to be altered if the good faith exception re-
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Most importantly, the dissent criticized the artificial dis-
tinction made between the magistrate and the police officer:
Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence,
and because such evidence generally has utility in our legal
system only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it
is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence
implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial
seizure of that evidence. 1 '
According to Justice Brennan, the "evidence-gathering role of
the police" is intertwined with the "evidence-admitting func-
tion of the courts."'" 2 He stated that the unlawful seizure of
evidence is a governmental action and once the connection be-
tween the role of the police and the role of the court is
credited, the plausibility of the majority holding becomes
suspect. 1 3
C. Analysis
The Leon decision has been written gradually over the
course of many years. When viewed in the isolation of a cost -
benefit analysis, it seems to be another step in a logical pro-
gression. When viewed in light of the overall goal of the
fourth amendment and the decision's future implications,
however, the good faith exception loses much of its appeal.
1. The Original Goal of the Fourth Amendment
The existence of the fourth amendment reflects the fram-
ers' belief that the effort to combat crime should not overtake
suited in a "material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. According to Justice Brennan, the good faith exception conveys the
message that magistrates need not be diligent in their duties. It also encourages police
officers to provide only the minimum amount of information neccessary to secure a
warrant. Once under the warrant, all police conduct will be insulated from review so
long as it is not "entirely unreasonable." Id. at 956-57 (quoting Brown v. Illinois. 422
U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
113. Id. at 933. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent, criticizing the majority for
creating the good faith exception when it could have decided the case on other grounds.
He argued that had the case been remanded and considered in light of the Illinois v.
Gates decision, the matter would have been resolved. Stevens also voiced a concern
that the good faith exception would encourage the police to take a chance and present
an application they know is insufficient. Therefore, the deterrent value of the exclusion-
ary rule is seriously damaged.
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the individual's right to privacy. The Constitution balances
the interest in public safety and the interest in individual pri-
vacy by allowing governmental invasion only when it is done
in a reasonable manner. A reasonable manner usually con-
notes a showing of probable cause and the possession of a
valid search warrant.
An analysis of costs and benefits is built into the amendment
itself. What courts must decide in the individual case is
whether the government acted reasonably in invading the
individual's privacy, not whether protection of such privacy
is too costly or of too little benefit to support vindication of
the right once they find a violation." 4
Not only has the Supreme Court lost sight of the framers'
intent to protect individual rights, it has increasingly over-
looked the exclusionary rule's effectiveness in vindicating
those rights once violated. The Court's interpretation of the
rule's purpose has shifted from consideration of whether the
exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for fourth amend-
ment violations to whether it deters unlawful police conduct
by "punishing" the offending officer. 15 The purpose of exclu-
sion is not to punish the specific officer, but to restrain the
power of the government as a whole.1 1 6 Exclusion prevents
the government from obtaining the aid of the judiciary in giv-
ing effect to fourth amendment violations by hearing the
tainted evidence.
Weeks v. United States'17 and Mapp v. Ohio" 8 used the
judicial integrity concept as a justification for the exclu-
sionary rule. However, courts have construed the language in
Mapp as only recognizing the rule's deterrent function. Mapp
did not refer to punishment of individual officers. Instead, it
114. Ingber, Defending the Citadel. The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable Good
Faith," 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1535 (1983).
A legal system that attempts simultaneously to control unacceptable deviance
and the behavior of the laws' enforcers is understandably complex in its appli-
cation to individual situations. A result in a specific case may seem inefficient
and improper. But such inefficiency and impropriety may be the cost of having
and enforcing controls upon the controllers - the fourth amendment, for exam-
ple - in the first place.
Id. at 1535-36 (footnotes omitted).
115. Id. at 1536.
116. Leon, 468 U.S. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
118. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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asserted that exclusion was necessary to deter by "com-
pel[ling] respect for the constitutional guaranty.., by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it."' 19 Thus, deterrence was not
aimed at punishing a specific officer but at demanding a legal
system that did not support a fourth amendment violation:
"Mapp's concept of deterrence was inherent in, rather than
separate from, its interest in judicial integrity . *.". .,12 These
theoretical underpinnings should not be ignored.
2. Costs Versus Benefits: An Artificial Balance
The Leon Court utilized the familiar balancing test to sup-
port the latest modification of the exclusionary rule. After the
"ritual incantation of the 'substantial social costs' " involved,
the Court concluded that the minimal deterrent value on of-
ficers acting in good faith did not justify application of the
rule.' 2 ' Considering the cases decided since Calandra, this
seems like a predetermined conclusion.
Assuming that the advisability of another modification of
the exclusionary rule could properly be decided by a cost -
benefit analysis, the Supreme Court should have engaged in a
fair assessment of the factors. 122 Instead, Justice White
greatly overstated the costs. As previously noted, studies have
shown that the exclusionary rule results in the non-conviction
of a very small percentage of individuals. 12 3 In terms of num-
bers, the convictions lost in 1979 equaled eight out of ten
thousand. 1 4 One reason that so few trials are adversely af-
fected is that the supression of some evidence does not auto-
matically leave the prosecution without a viable case. If the
Court in Leon had applied the more lenient probable cause
standard announced in Illinois v. Gates,125 for example, the
warrant probably would have survived scrutiny. Further,
none of the defendants in the Leon case had standing to chal-
119. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). See also
Ingber, supra note 114, at 1536-37.
120. See Ingber, supra note 114, at 1537.
121. Leon, 468 U.S. at 949 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. See LaFave, supra note 80, at 903.
123. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
124. See Davies, supra note 59, at 654.
125. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See supra note 83.
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lenge all of the drug searches conducted. 26 Therefore, the
bulk of the evidence seized would have been admissible.
Whatever the total costs of applying the exclusionary rule
are, it is not fair to use all of them when engaging in a cost -
benefit analysis.12 7 In reviewing figures from various studies,
Justice Brennan stated:
Of course, these data describe only the costs attributable to
the exclusion of evidence in all cases; the cost due to the
exclusion of evidence in the narrower category of cases
where police have made objectively reasonable mistakes
must necessarily be even smaller. The Court, however, ig-
nores this distinction and mistakenly weighs the aggregated
costs of exclusion in all cases, irrespective of the circum-
stances that led to exclusion against the potential benefits as-
sociated with only those cases in which evidence is excluded
because police reasonably but mistakenly believe that their
conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment. When
such faulty scales are used, it is little wonder that the bal-
ance tips in favor of restricting the application of the rule. 21
In contrast to the overstatement of costs, the Leon opinion
underrated the benefits associated with the exclusionary rule.
The Court mistakenly reviewed the deterrent value of the rule
in terms of how well it would punish individual police officers
for their violation of fourth amendment standards. This
"specific deterrence" approach is unnecessarily narrow. The
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is realized in its regu-
latory effect on the law enforcement system as a whole. Ap-
plication of the rule can have a deterrent effect even if the
officer acted with a good faith but mistaken belief that his con-
duct was authorized by a valid search warrant:129
If evidence is consistently excluded in these circumstances,
police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their
officers to devote greater care and attention to promoting
sufficient information to establish probable cause when ap-
plying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the
form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than
automatically assuming that whatever document the magis-
126. For a discussion of the standing requirement see supra notes 64-65 and accom-
panying text.
127. See LaFave, supra note 80, at 904.
128. Leon, 468 U.S. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 954.
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trate has signed will necessarily comport with Fourth
Amendment requirements. 3 °
The "specific deterrence" concept used by the Supreme
Court is also unnecessarily narrow in that it discards the ex-
clusionary rule's deterrent effect on magistrates. The fourth
amendment was intended to restrain both the officer and the
magistrate as members of the government. Arguably, the
magistrate, as the guardian of the court, is more responsible
than the police officer for protecting fourth amendment rights
and for preventing the use of illegal evidence in court. Yet the
good faith exception insulates the magistrate's decisions from
review.' 3 ' There is nothing left to deter them from carelessly
considering warrant applications. It is clear that if the
Supreme Court had actually weighed the cost versus the bene-
fits of the exclusionary rule, it would not have created a good
faith exception.
3. Dangerous Implications for the Future
The most troubling aspect of the Leon decision is the au-
thority it will give the Supreme Court to further emasculate
the exclusionary rule. In Illinois v. Krull, 32 a detective relied,
in good faith, on a statute which appeared to authorize a war-
rantless search of the respondent's business.' 33 The statute
was subsequently held to be unconstitutional, but the evidence
seized pursuant to the statute was not supressed at trial. Para-
phrasing the language from Leon, the Supreme Court rea-
soned: "Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error,
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deter-
rence of Fourth Amendment violations."'
34
Based on the Krull case, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court will use Leon as precedent for a good faith exception in
warrantless situations. 35 It is also likely that when the Court
130. Id. at 955.
131. See LaFave, supra note 80, at 906-09.
132. 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
133. Id. at 1163.
134. Id. at 1167.
135. This question would have been answered had it not been for the death of the
defendant in People v. Ouintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983). See also New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school officials may conduct warrantless searches if there
are reasonable grounds to believe the student has violated school rules); United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (federal agents did not violate fourth amendment standards
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applies its cost - benefit analysis to the warrantless search, the
outcome will be in favor of admitting the evidence. Under
this rationale, as long as the police were acting in "good
faith," the deterrent value of the rule would not be furthered
by excluding relative and probative evidence. This would
complete the Supreme Court's "victory over the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule" 136 and leave the states as the
only source of protection for the rights of the criminal
defendant.
IV. THE "NEW FEDERALISM" IN THE STATES
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not the only
entity that has suffered because of the Burger Court's prefer-
ence for effective law enforcement. The fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel were also narrowly construed. 137  The decisions
handed down quickly conveyed the Burger Court's intention
to constrict the rights given to criminal defendants during the
Warren era. As the scope of federally based rights narrowed,
a "new federalism" emerged among the states.1 38 In an effort
to provide greater protection under state law than that re-
quired by the Federal Constitution, state courts began to re-
ject the restrictions on rights pronounced by the United
States Supreme Court:
The teachings of the Warren Court concerning the rights of
criminal defendants have not fallen on deaf ears. Many state
judiciaries have greeted the Burger Court's retreat from ac-
tivism not with submission, but with a stubborn indepen-
dence that displays a determination to keep alive the Warren
Court's philosophical commitment to protection of the
criminal suspect.'
39
when they conducted a warrantless search of packages found in vehicles seized three
days before search).
136. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600 (1974); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972).
138. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 425 (1974) [hereinafter Wilkes. The New
Federalism].
139. Wilkes, More on the New Federalism, supra note 2, at 873.
19871
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The states' willingness to provide for rights lost under the fed-
eral good faith exception is the latest example of new federal-
ism in criminal procedure. Rejection of the Leon decision
acknowledges its unsound reasoning and the states' refusal to
submit to the "seductive call of expediency."14
The state court decisions rejecting the good faith exception
are based on the adequate state ground rule. Under this doc-
trine, the United States Supreme Court is precluded from re-
viewing a state court decision that rests on an adequate state
ground, even if it involves a federal question. 41 In criminal
cases, the state ground asserted is usually a state rule of proce-
dure. However, the doctrine also includes substantive
grounds. Thus, the rule enables a state court to "immunize its
decisions from [Supreme] Court review by basing its judgment
on a state right which is coextensive with or broader than
rights afforded by federal law." '142
In State v. Novembrino, 43 the New Jersey Superior Court
noted the broadness of Article I, Section 7 of the New Jersey
state constitution as .compared to the fourth amendment:
"Art. I, § 7 is an explicit affirmation of fundamental rights of
privacy; it is a guarantee of those rights and not simply a re-
striction on them."" Based on the structural differences be-
tween the state and federal constitutions and New Jersey's
history of adherence to the protective rules governing search
warrants, the court declined to adopt the good faith exception.
140. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 930 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Warren Court often encouraged states to impose higher standards than those required
by the Federal Constitution. The Burger Court also acknowledged the right of the state
courts to ground their decisions in state law. However, it was usually the dissenting
opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens that cautioned that the guarantees
extended under the Federal Constitution are minimum guarantees only. See generally
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1977).
141. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court decisions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, provided the state judgment involves a federal question. Although
the statute authorizes review of state judgments involving federal questions regardless of
the presence of questions of state law, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to
review judgments resting on an adequate state ground. See Bice, Anderson and the
Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Wilkes, The New Federalism.
supra note 136, at 426-27; Note, Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Emerging Inde-
pendence of State Courts, 1979 HAMLINE L. REV. 83.
142. See Wilkes, More on the New Federalism, supra note 2, at 873-74.
143. 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 (1985).
144. Id. at -, 491 A.2d at 43.
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According to the New Jersey Superior Court, the Leon good
faith exception eliminates any meaningful review of probable
cause determinations:
Long experience with the suppression rule leaves us with the
settled conviction that once the police act under cover of a
warrant, even though issued without probable cause, as a
practical matter their good faith is immune to attack. The
Leon good faith exception contemplates that appellate courts
defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to the police. It
fosters a careless attitude toward details by the police and
issuing judicial officers and it even encourages them to at-
tempt to get away with conduct which was heretofore
viewed as unconstitutional. 145
Because of the broader protection guaranteed to an individual
under the New Jersey Constitution, the court held that the
state is not permitted to introduce evidence which has been
seized without probable cause. According to the court, "[t]he
admission of that evidence would not only violate N.J. Const.
(1947), Art. I, § 7, but would violate the integrity of the court
and the State's long tradition of providing a meaningful rem-
edy to redress constitutional violations."' 146
Rejecting a federal decision as violative of the state consti-
tution is a valid exercise of state power. Although the
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provisions of the
Federal Constitution is persuasive, it is binding only to the
extent that the Court's reasoning is logical. 147 In Stringer v.
State, 148 the Mississippi Supreme Court was unpersuaded by
the Leon analysis:
The fundamental error in Leon is its failure to perceive that
its new "insight" - that in the type of cases we are con-
cerned with it is the issuing magistrate who violates the ac-
cused's Fourth Amendment rights, not the police officer -
suggests a greater need for the exclusionary rule, not a lesser
one. 1
49
The court explained that theoretically citizens may bring a
civil damage claim against a police officer who violates fourth
145. Id. at -, 491 A.2d at 45.
146. Id. at -, 491 A.2d at 46.
147. Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground,
61 CAL. L. REV. 281-82.
148. 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986).
149. Id. at 849.
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amendment standards. Against the issuing magistrate, how-
ever, the citizen is left without a remedy because the judiciary
enjoys an absolute immunity to a suit for damages. 150 This
leaves the individual with a right but no remedy to ensure that
issuing magistrates take their responsibilities seriously.
The court in Stringer criticized the Supreme Court for not
considering the practical implications of the Leon decision.
Instead of suggesting an appropriate alternative, the Supreme
Court simply stated that the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct and concluded that it does not
achieve that end. The Leon decision never considered that
the exclusionary rule is the only practical means of getting the
attention of issuing magistrates who disregard the rights of
persons to be free from unreasonable searches.' 5 ' Further-
more, enforcement of the rule restores the status quo. If the
state had not conducted the illegal search, it would not have
the evidence it seeks to use against the defendant at trial.
Therefore, exclusion returns the parties to their pre-violation
position. 152
The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that although the
exclusionary rule might be obsolete in other jurisdictions, it
still regarded the rule as an important means of protecting
Mississippi citizens from searches made pursuant to warrants
issued without probable cause. "Until our attention is called
to substantial recurring miscarriages of justice proximately
flowing from the enforcement of our exclusionary rule and un-
til equally effective alternatives are presented, we should not
consider abandonment of our rule."'1 53
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York did not con-
sider the good faith exception an effective alternative. In Peo-
ple v. Bigelow,'54 the court stated that if the good faith
exception was adopted, "the exclusionary rule's purpose
would be completely frustrated, a premium [would be] placed
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 850.
153. Id. at 842. The court stated that "the adoption of the new federally modified
exclusionary rule more reflects a shift in judicial/political ideology than a judicial re-
sponse to demonstrable and felt societal needs. If [the exclusionary rule] ain't broke,
why fix it?" Id. at 849-50.
154. 66 N.Y.2d 417, -, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, - (1985).
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on the illegal police action and a positive incentive [would be]
provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the fu-
ture." The court, therefore, rejected the Leon decision on
state constitutional grounds.
Other states refusing to blindly follow the Supreme Court
include Michigan, 155 Minnesota156 and Texas. 157 Idaho im-
plied it will reject the good faith exception when the issue is
properly presented. 58 While the number of states rejecting
the good faith exception remain in the minority, they are nev-
ertheless of tremendous importance. They reflect an effort to
"breathe new life into the federal due process clause" by inter-
preting their constitutions more expansively than the Federal
Constitution. 159 Those that criticize state court independence
because of the lack of uniformity it produces, ignore the fact
that the federal system has always tolerated variations in sub-
stantive criminal laws. State and federal governments prop-
erly have differing rules of criminal procedure to
accommodate the different purposes they serve. States should
be encouraged to experiment with different approaches in an
effort to obtain the best system possible.
Nevertheless, some state courts remain content to inter-
pret state constitutional provisions exactly as the Supreme
Court interprets their federal counterparts. In comparing
numbers, it appears that many states have affirmed the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in Leon. Upon closer observation,
however, it is clear that many of the jurisdictions did not em-
brace the merits of the Leon decision but employed a good
faith exception for some other reason. For example, Colorado
has a statutory good faith exception. The statute is divided
into good faith mistakes and technical violations, both of
which were discussed in People v. Mitchell.60 The court noted
that the statutory definition of "good faith mistake" - an er-
ror in facts that if true would otherwise constitute probable
cause - was merely a redefinition of probable cause. A tech-
nical violation was defined as a good faith reliance on a statute
155. See People v. David, 119 Mich. App. 289, 326 N.W.2d 485 (1982).
156. See State v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
157. See Polk v. State, 704 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
158. See State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986).
159. See Brennan, supra note 140, at 503.
160. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
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later overruled or a court precedent subsequently striken. In
Mitchell, the warrant was not issued in reliance on mistaken
facts. Instead, the warrant failed because the evidence demon-
strated no facts to justify its issuance. Thus, the statutory
good faith exception did not apply. 61 It is clear that this situ-
ation is more analogous to the Michigan v. DeFillippo 162 deci-
sion, than to the good faith exception adopted in Leon.
Ohio's decision to adopt the good faith exception was not
based on the merits of Leon but on a pre-existing state court
opinion to that effect. In State v. Williams, 63 the appellant
contended that his arrest, executed without a warrant, vio-
lated both his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Rely-
ing on a case decided after his detention in which the Supreme
Court invalidated warrantless searches, he asserted that the
illegally seized evidence should be suppressed. After exten-
sively quoting from United States v. Peltier,64 the court re-
fused to apply the exclusionary rule retroactively because the
police officers had effected the arrest in good faith reliance on
a then constitutional statute. 6- Again, the decision was
based on the exception created in the DeFillippo and Peltier
cases rather than the good faith exception established in Leon.
Finally, there are states which have adopted the Leon ex-
ception because the scope of the state exclusionary rule is co-
extensive with the federal rule. For example, a 1982
amendment to Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitu-
tion removed that state's option to provide greater protection
to its citizens. The amendment provides:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or in-
formation obtained in violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if [they] would be inadmissible under
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the
4th Amendment .... 6 6
161. Id. at 995-96. See Note. People v. Mitchell: The Good Faith Exception in
Colorado, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 841 (1985).
162. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
163. 6 Ohio St. 3d 281, 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983).
164. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
165. Id. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 1328-29.
166. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12, (1982). See State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983).
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Since the exclusionary rule is written into the text of the state
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it is subject to the United States Supreme Court's
shifting interpretation of the rule.
Likewise, a 1982 amendment providing that "relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding" de-
feated the new federalism movement in California. 6 7  In
People v. Lance W., 68 the court held that this provision abro-
gated the state's "vicarious" exclusionary rule but did not re-
peal the Section Thirteen guarantee against unwarranted
governmental intrusions. However, the amendment did elimi-
nate the judicially created exclusionary rule in criminal pro-
ceedings, regardless of how the evidence was obtained,
"except to the extent that exclusion remains federally com-
pelled."1 69 Thus, evidence seized in violation of state consti-
tutional standards is excluded only if mandated by the federal
exclusionary rule.
The great majority of states that have adopted Leon do so
without any independent analysis.1 70  Although it may be
convenient, this is a perilous trend. If the decisions of the
Supreme Court continue to interpret the Constitution as only
providing minimal standards of protection, all rights above
this minimum level will exist only by virtue of state law. To
summarily dismiss the option to provide greater protection is
to deny the individual his last source of hope.
167. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The California Constitution provides:
Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by
a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial
and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile
for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this
section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
Id.
168. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
169. Id. at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
170. See, e.g., McBride v. State, 492 So. 2d 654 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Toland v.
State, 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d 718 (1985); State v. Cooper, 9 Conn. App. 15, 514
A.2d 758 (1986); Matter of M.R.D., 482 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 1985); State v. Sweeney, 701
S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1985); State v. Welch, __ N.C. -, 342 S.E.2d 789 (1986); State v.




Individuals have a right to be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures. At the same time, society has a right to
disturb the privacy of individuals if necessary to enforce crimi-
nal laws. The Constitution recognizes the need for effective
law enforcement and prescribes the methods by which police
may proceed. In cases where the methods are adhered to, the
exclusionary rule does not operate. In cases where the gov-
ernment abuses its power, however, the individual is entitled
to an effective remedy such as the exclusionary rule. Thus, a
balance is built into the Constitution itself.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has distorted this bal-
ance. Faced with the increasing levels of crime, the Court
continually modified the exclusionary rule in an effort to con-
vict the guilty. Although fighting crime is an admirable goal,
the Supreme Court has gone too far. By adopting the good
faith exception they have effectively undermined the protec-
tion of the exclusionary rule and left the individual without a
remedy for the violation of his fourth amendment rights. The
Sheppard Court announced that an "error of constitutional
dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issu-
ance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police of-
ficers, who made the critical mistake." '' This statement is
little consolation to the victim whose privacy has been uncon-
stitutionally invaded and who faces the prospect of having the
illegally seized evidence used against him at trial. Although it
is impossible to foresee exactly what impact the good faith ex-
ception will have on fourth amendment law, it is likely that
the exception will be broadly construed for the sake of
expediency.
State courts that have avoided the good faith issue should
be aware of the threat the Leon decision poses to individual
rights.'72 Because of this threat, an increasing number of
states have rejected the good faith exception. 173 Refusing to
sacrifice constitutional rights in exchange for effective law en-
forcement, they have used their state constitutions to limit the
171. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984).
172. See, e.g., State v. Shiffiett, 199 Conn. 718, 508 A.2d 748 (1986); State v. Bous-
man, 387 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1986); State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 388 N.W.2d 151
(1986). For a discussion of the good faith exception's place in Wisconsin see 59 Wis. B.
BULl.. 19 (1986).
173. See supra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
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broad grant of power given to the government by the Supreme
Court. Hopefully, state courts that have not ruled on the
good faith issue will follow their example. Further, the states
that have adopted the Leon decision should reconsider and
join the new federalism movement. Without state protection,
fourth amendment rights will continue to be eroded.
V. CONCLUSION
Whenever the scope of the exclusionary rule is modified in
the interest of effective law enforcement, there is necessarily a
shift in the delicate balance of our right to privacy versus our
right to be free from criminal attack. By creating the good
faith exception, the Supreme Court destroyed that balance
by disregarding individual rights and leaning too heavily in
favor of convicting the guilty. Some states have countered by
rejecting the good faith exception and by keeping their state
exclusionary rules intact. They recognize that abandonment
of the rule would result in a loss of respect for constitutional
values and would deny a remedy to the victims of unlawful
official behavior.
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